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MUELLER V ALLEN:

CLARIFYING OR CONFUSING

ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE ANALYSIS OF STATE AID
TO PUBLIC SCHOOLS?
I.

INTRODUCTION

In Mue/er v. Allen', the latest chapter in the continuing controversy over
state aid to parochial schools, the United States Supreme Court resolved the
conflict between the circuits regarding the constitutionality of tax benefits
for parents of nonpublic school students. The court did not, however, suc2
ceed in clarifying its own inconsistencies in this area.
In Mueller, the Court affirmed the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals' decision to uphold a Minnesota statute 3 granting parents of children attending
both public and nonpublic elementary and secondary schools tax deductions
for tuition, textbook and transportation expenses. Taxpayers had challenged the statute's constitutionality, arguing it violates the establishment
5
clause 4 because it provides impermissible aid to sectarian schools.
A similar challenge had previously succeeded in Rhode IslandFederationof
Teachers v. Norberg6 when the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit invalidated the tax relief provided under a Rhode Island statute7 virtually identi1. 103 S. Ct. 3062 (1983) aJ'g 676 F.2d 1195 (8th Cir. 1982), aff'd 514 F. Supp. 998 (D.
Minn. 1981).
2. See Comment, Church and State.- The Past, Present, and Future of State Aid to Parochial
Schools, 9 Sw. UL. REV. 1211, 1211 (1977) (describes the law regulating state aid to nonpublic
schools as a "chaotic compilation of inconsistent decisions"). See generally Note, Rebuilding the
Wall The Casefor a Return to the Strict Interpretation ofthe Establishment Clause, 81 COLUM. L. REV.
1463 (1981) (general discussion of the Supreme Court's contradictory applications of the establishment clause).
3. MINN. STAT. § 290.09(22) (1982), repealed by 1983 Minn. Laws c. 342, art. 1, § 44. The
statute allowed the following deductions from gross income in computing net taxable income:
Tuition and transportation expense. The amount he has paid to others, not to exceed
$500 for each dependent in grades K to 6 and $700 for each dependent in grades 7 to
12, for tuition, textbooks and transportation of each dependent in attending an elementary or secondary school situated in Minnesota, North Dakota, South Dakota,
Iowa, or Wisconsin, wherein a resident of this state may legally fulfill the state's compulsory attendance laws, which is not operated for profit, and which adheres to the
provisions of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and chapter 363. As used in this subdivision,
"textbooks" shall mean and include books and other instructional materials and
equipment used in elementary and secondary schools in teaching only those subjects
legally and commonly taught in public elementary and secondary schools in this state
and shall not include instructional books and materials used in the teaching of religious tenets, doctrines or worship, the purpose of which is to inculcate such tenets,
doctrines or worship, nor shall it include such books or materials for, or transportation
to, extracurricular activities including sporting events, musical or dramatic events,
speech activities, driver's education, or programs of a similar nature.
4. "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion.
U.S.
CONST. amend. 1,cl. 1. The first amendment is made applicable to the states by the due process
clause of the fourteenth amendment. Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105, 108 (1943); accord
Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
5. Mueller, 514 F. Supp. at 999.
6. 630 F.2d 855 (1st Cir. 1980).
7. R.I. GEN. LAWS § 44-30-12(c)(2) (1980).
This statute provides the following
deductions:
(c) Modifications Reducing Federal Adjusted Gross Income.-
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cal to the Minnesota statute challenge in Mudler.'
This direct conflict between the Eighth and First Circuits reflects the
overall confusion regarding the Supreme Court's interpretation of the establishment clause constraints on government aid to religion 9 and suggests that
lower courts as well as state legislatures do not have the guidance necessary
to formulate constitutionally permissible aid programs.10 Whether the
Court's decision in Mueller provides this needed guidance is doubtful.
This comment will describe the development of the establishment
clause doctrine in the area of state aid to church-affiliated schools and will
explain the three-part inquiry applied in contemporary establishment clause
cases. It will discuss the Mueller holding and analyze the Court's rationale in
terms of the contemporary three-part test and in view of establishment
clause precedent. Finally, it will suggest the impact Mueller V. Allen may have
on future establishment clause analysis in the area of state aid to parochial
schools.
II.

DEVELOPMENT OF ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE DOCTRINE AND STATE
AID TO PAROCHIAL SCHOOLS

A.

Evolution ofthe Three-Part Test

The first amendment of the United States Constitution contains two
references to religion: the establishment clause,"' which forbids laws "respecting an establishment of religion"; and the free exercise clause, which
forbids laws "prohibiting the free exercise" 1 2 of religion. Through these two
clauses the framers intended, at the very least, to protect individual expresThere shall be subtracted from federal adjusted gross income... (2) amounts paid to
others, not to exceed five hundred dollars ($500) for each dependent in kindergarten
through sixth (6th) grade and seven hundred dollars ($700) for each dependent in
grades seven (7) through twelve (12) inclusive, for tuition, textbooks, and transportation of each such dependent attending an elementary or secondary school situated in
Rhode Island, Massachusetts, Connecticut, Vermont, New Hampshire or Maine,
wherein a resident of this state may legally fulfill the state's compulsory attendance
laws, which is not operated for profit, and which adheres to the provisions of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964. As used in this section, "textbooks" shall mean and include books
and other instructional materials and equipment used in elementary and secondary
schools in teaching only those subjects legally and commonly taught in public elementary and secondary schools in this state and shall not include instructional books and
materials used in the teaching of religious tenets, doctrines or worship, the purpose of
which is to inculcate such tenets, doctrines or worship.
8. Compare MINN. STAT. § 290.09(22) (1982), supra note 3, with R.I. GEN. LAWS § 44-3012(c)(2) (1980),supra note 7. Both statutes provide tax deductions from taxpayers' gross income
for the tuition, textbook and transportation expenses of each dependent attending either a public or nonpublic elementary or secondary school and both statutes set forth three criteria for
determining the eligibility of the schools: the schools must conform to the state's compulsory
attendance laws; the schools must not be operated for profit; and the schools must adhere to the
provisions of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.
9. See Note, The Constitutionatityof Tax Reteffor Parents of Children Attending Pubic and Nonpubhc Schools, 67 MINN. L. REV. 793, 806 (1983) (noting the lack of clarity and predictability in
the Supreme Court's approach to school aid cases).
10. See Comment, supra note 2, at 1245-46 (concluding that the Supreme Court's inconsistent treatment of school aid cases has resulted in confusion in the state legislatures and lower
courts).
11. U.S. CONST. amend. I, cl. 1.
12. Id.
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sion of religious beliefs and to guarantee the separation of church and
state. 13

Originally, at the urging of James Madison and Thomas Jefferson, the
free exercise and the nonestablishment' 4 of religion were promoted as inseparable concepts.' 5 Over the past three decades, however, the Supreme Court
has not adopted such an approach 16 and has reviewed the clauses independently, analyzing each case under the establishment clause or the free exercise clause. 17 Cases involving government aid to parochial schools have
13. Comment, Mueller v. Allen: Do Tuition Tax Deductions Violate the Establishment Clause? 68
IowA L. REV. 539, 542 (1983); L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTrrUTIONAL LAW, § 14-4, at 818-19
(1978). Tribe suggests that two fundamental principles underlie the establishment and free
exercise clauses: voluntarism and separatism or "neutrality." Designed to prevent any direct or
indirect compulsion in matters of belief, the free exercise clause is a mandate of religious voluntarism. The establishment clause embodies the voluntarism concept in terms of ensuring that
the church sustains itself only through voluntary support of its followers, not from political
support of the state. The separatism principle requires that the state refrain from involvement
in religious affairs and prohibits fragmentation of the body politic by reason of sectarian differences. L. TRIBE, supra, at 818-19.
14. Because the establishment clause is prohibitive, it is often referred to as the nonestablishment principle. See, e.g., Case Comment, Statute Granting Tax Deduction for Tuition Paid by
Parentsof Sectarian and NonsectarianSchool Children Does Not Violate the Establishment Clause: Mueller
v. Allen, 61 WASH. U.L.Q. 269, 272 (1983).
15. Case Comment,supra note 14, at 271-72. See also L. TRIBE, supra note 13, at § 14-2, 814
(noting that the framers considered the clauses "at least compatible and at best mutually supportive"). James Madison believed that the separation of religion and government was essential
for each to achieve its highest purposes. In contrast, Thomas Jefferson supported separation
primarily as a means to protect the state from the church. Jefferson believed that only the
strictest "wall of separation between church and state" would eliminate the formal influence of
religious institutions from politics and preserves free choice among political views. L. TRIBE,
supra note 13, at 817.
When in 1785 the General Assembly of Virginia attempted to renew the state's tax levy in
support of the Episcopal Church, Virginia's established church, Jefferson and Madison led the
opposition against this bill. In 1786 Madison issued his famous "Memorial and Remonstrance"
denouncing the tax. His views received strong support throughout Virginia and the bill died in
committee. Upon the tax levy's defeat, the Virginia legislature enacted Jefferson's "Virginia
Bill for Religious Liberty." Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 11-12 (1947).
Scholars have treated the Virginia experience as the origin of the first amendment's free
exercise and establishment clauses. Comment, supra note 2, at 1212 n.4. The Everson Court
suggested that Jefferson's "Virginia Bill for Religious Liberty" was, in fact, the basis of the first
amendment's religious liberty provisions. See Everson, 330 U.S. at 13.
In the midst of conflicting interpretations of the first amendment, many commentators
have criticized the emphasis given the views of Madison and Jefferson, recognizing that "a too
literal a quest for the advice of the Founding Fathers" is often futile, Abington School Dist. v.
Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 237 (1963) (Brennan, J., concurring). See generally L. TRIBE, supra note
13, at § 14-3 (discussing the problems involved in relying too heavily on the framers' intent).
16. Note, Laws Respecting an Establishment of Reliion: An Inquig Into Tuition Tax Benefits, 58
N.Y.U. L. REV. 207, 207-8 n.5 (1983); Case Comment, supra note 14, at 272.
17. The Supreme Court has recognized that the two clauses may overlap. See Abington
School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 222 (1963) (a Pennsylvania statute which required that
Bible verses be recited daily in the public schools was held to be violative of the establishment
clause). There is a natural antagonism between a prohibition against establishing a religion and
a prohibition against inhibiting its practice. An example of the tension between the clauses that
arises from this natural antagonism was offered by Justice Stewart in his dissenting opinion in
Schempp: Spending federal funds to employ chaplains for the army would be a violation of the
establishment clause, "[y]et a lonely soldier stationed at some faraway outpost could surely complain that a government which did not provide him the opportunity for pastoral guidance was
affirmatively prohibiting the free exercise of his religion." See id. at 309 (Stewart, J., dissenting)
(italics in original). "The Court has struggled to find a neutral course between the two Religion
Clauses, both of which are cast in absolute terms, and either of which, if expanded to a logical
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traditionally been analyzed under the establishment clause.' 8
Government assistance to religious education was widespread in the
United States when the first amendment was adopted' 9 and controversies
over public aid to sectarian schools have erupted sporadically at both the
state and federal levels since colonial times. 20 The establishment clause,
however, supported few challenges to state and federal legislation prior to
World War 11.21
It wasn't until 1947, in Everson v. BoardofEducation,22 that the Supreme
Court first applied the establishment clause to state legislation. 2 3 In Everson
the Court adopted the first tier of modern establishment clause analysis: the
24
secular purpose test.
The New Jersey statute2 5 challenged in Everson authorized local school
districts to provide transportation to nonpublic as well as public school
pupils. Writing for the majority, Justice Black reasoned that only a strict
extreme, would tend to clash with the other." Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 668-69
(1970).
Several commentators have urged that consideration of both clauses is essential to a full
and fair determination of any individual case arising under them. See, e.g., P. KURLAND, RELIGION AND LAW 16-18 (1962); L. TRIBE, supra note 13, at § 14-7, 833-34; Choper, The Relgion
Clause of the First Amendment. Reconciling the Conftict, 41 U. PrrT. L. REV. 673 (1980). Professor
Philip Kurland proposes that the clauses be read together to state a single precept: the prohibition of classification in terms of religion whether to confer a benefit or to impose a burden. P.
KURLAND, supra, at 112. The Court, however, has never adopted this theory. See J. NOWAK, R.
ROTUNDA, J. NELSON YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1034 (2d ed. 1983) (noting the theoretical appeal of Kurland's theory and contrasting it with the Court's present treatment of claims
under the religion clauses).
18. Note, supra note 16, at 207-8 n.5; Case Comment, supra note 14, at 272. Arguments
that the free exercise clause mandates government funding of parochial schools' secular functions have been rejected by the courts. See Brusca v. Missouri ex. rel.
State Bd. of Educ., 332 F.
Supp. 275, 278-79 (E.D. Mo. 1971) (state constitutional provision and statutes prohibiting public aid to sectarian schools are not violations of the free exercise clause), admem., 405 U.S. 1050
(1972). Further, the Supreme Court has not accepted the free exercise argument that while
government does not have to support such schools, itshould be allowed to do so if it chooses. See
Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 788-89 (1973) (acknowledging that a law interfering with a parent's right to have a child educated in a sectarian
school could "run afoul of the Free Exercise Clause," but finding this insufficient justification
for "an eroding of the limitations of the Establishment Clause").
19. See Note, supra note 9, at 797, n.20 (between 1770 and 1820 virtually all American
schools were private, religiously affiliated and publicly supported); see also R. MORGAN, THE
SUPREME COURT AND RELIGION 48 (1972) (prior to 1830, private education was the only education available in America).
20. See generally
Note,supra note 9, at 797, & n.21 (describes several of the colonial and
nineteenth century controversies arising out of opposition to various forms of state aid to religious education).
21. Although the Court had handled religious issues prior to Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1 (1947), it never squarely faced the establishment clause question. Id. at 15,
n.21. See, e.g., Cochran v. Louisiana State Bd. of Educ., 281 U.S. 370 (1930) (approving loan of
texts because of the public purpose); Quick Bear v. Leupp, 210 U.S. 50 (1908) (upholding use of
Indian trust funds by government for payment of tuition to parochial schools on reservations
because of private nature of the funds); Bradfield v. Roberts, 175 U.S. 291 (1899) (allowing
funds for expansion of hospital operated by religious order because institution's purpose not
religious).
22. 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
23. Case Comment, supra note 14, at 272.
24. Id
25. N.J. REV. STAT. § 18-14-8 (Curi. Supp. 1944).
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policy of no-aid 26 to parochial education could preserve the original meaning of the establishment clause. 27 Nevertheless, incidental benefits to religious institutions are permissible if the legislation encompasses a valid
secular purpose. 28 Applying this test, the Court held that legislation ensuring the safe delivery of children to and from school had a public welfare
rather than religious goal, 29 and consequently, the program was
30
permissible.
For sixteen years after Everson, the Court searched for valid secular purposes as it struggled with first amendment challenges to Sunday closing
laws,3 released time arrangements 32 on 33 and off34 public school premises,
and prayer recitation in public schools. 35 When it became apparent that
lawmakers were attempting to circumvent constitutional challenges by supplying clearly religious legislation with statements of legitimate secular purpose, 36 the Court added a second level to the establishment clause inquiry:
the primary effect test.
The primary effect test demands that the principal consequences of a
law neither positively nor negatively bear upon religion. 37 Under this rationale, although a statute has a purported secular purpose, the courts may
invalidate it if it has the primary effect of either advancing or inhibiting
26. Case Comment, supra note 14, at 272-73. Justice Black stated that the Constitution
forbids the state to pass laws that aid one religion, all religions, or show a preference for one
religion over another. Everson, 330 U.S. at 15. Despite that pronouncement, however, the Court
has not followed a strict no-aid policy. Case Comment, supra note 14, at 272-73 n.31. See also
Kauper, The Walz Decision.- More on the Religion Clauses of the First Amendment, 69 MICH. L. REV.
179, 180 (1970) (asserting that in the Court's view, complete separation of church and state is
impossible).
27. The Court sought to adhere to the meaning of the clause as envisioned by Madison
and Jefferson in determining that a strict nonestablishment theory prohibits a state from setting
up a church or passing laws to aid one or more churches. Everson, 330 U.S. at 15-16. Seegenerally
supra note 15.
28. See Everson, 330 U.S. at 17-18.
29. This public welfare rationale has been recognized as the child benefit theory. Case
Comment, supra note 14, at 273 n.34; Hunter, The Continuing Debate Over Tuition Tax Credits, 7
HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 523, 529 (1980). For a general discussion of the child benefit theory, see
Gianella, Religious Liberty, Nonestab/ishment, and DoctrinalDevelopment, 81 HARV. L. REV. 513, 57681 (1968).
30. The Court suggested, however, that it had approached the limit of constitutionality.
See 330 U.S. at 16.
31. See McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961) (upholding Sunday closing laws because of the secular value of receiving a day of rest).
32. A released time arrangement allows public school students time away from their secular studies for religious instruction when they do not have access to sectarian schools. Case
Comment, supra note 14, at 274 n.38.
33. See Illinois ex re. McCollum v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203 (1948) (invalidating release time program with religious instruction on public school property).
34. See Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306 (1952) (relied on free exercise clause to approve
release of students for religion classes outside public school premises).
35. See Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962) (prohibiting prayer in public school
classrooms).
36. See Case Comment, supra note 14, at 274. Generally the Court accepts legislative statements of secular purpose at face value and does not strike down legislation authorizing aid to
nonpublic schools on this ground. See Minnesota Civil Liberties Union v. Roemer, 452 F. Supp.
1316, 1318 n.l (D. Minn. 1978).
37. Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 222 (1963).
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religion. 38 The Supreme Court first applied the primary effect test in Abington School Distrct v. Schempp 39 to invalidate statutes requiring Bible readings
and prayer recitation in public schools.
The Court utilized the two-prong purpose-effect test five years after
Schempp in Boardof Education v. Allen 4 0 to uphold a New York textbook loan
program which provided for the loan of textbooks to private and public
school pupils. The Court reasoned that since the financial benefit of the
state aid flowed to the parents and children, not directly to the schools, the
41
statute did not have the primary effect of advancing religion.
Two years later, in Walz v. Tax Commission,42 the Court adopted the
third and final prong of the establishment clause test when it denied challenge to the tax exempt status conferred on church property by the New
York Constitution. The Court stated three primary reasons for its holding.
First, the Court explained that state and federal history support the acceptance of such an exemption. 43 Second, the Court looked to the breadth of the
class benefiting from the New York statute. 44 The Court noted that religious
institutions represented merely one of the several nonprofit, quasi-public cor45
porations and institutions deemed exempt from taxation under the statute.
Finally, the Court noted that the state involvement caused by the tax exemption was "minimal and remote" 46 compared to the contact that would
result between the church and state officials if religious institutions were subject to taxation. Such taxation would result in greater entanglement in the
form of "tax valuation of church property, tax liens, tax foreclosures, and the
direct confrontations and conflicts that follow in the train of those legal
processes." 47 Concern with this last element, excessive entanglement between church and state, represents the third factor in subsequent establishment clause analysis.
The entanglement test was developed more fully and received its clearest articulation in Lemon v. Kurtzman ,48 which invalidated state subsidy of
38. In practice two criteria determine whether a statute will pass the primary effect test.
See generally Comment, Tax Deductions for Parents of Children Attending Pubh&and Nonpubl& Schools:
Mueller v. Allen, 71 Ky. L.J. 685, 687-90 (1982-83) (discussing application of the primary effect
test). The first criterion demands that the activity aided is such that its secular aspects are
identifiable and separable from its religious aspects so that a court can be certain only secular
activities are aided. See Levitt v. Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty, 413 U.S. 472,
480 (1973). The second criterion looks to the breadth of the benefitted class. If the class is too
narrow, the statute is suspect. See Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religous Liberty v. Nyquist, 413
U.S. 756, 794 (1973).
39. 374 U.S. 203 (1963).
40. 392 U.S. 236 (1968).
41. Id. at 243-44. This rationale is an application of the child benefit theory which had its
origin in the public welfare rationale employed in Everson. See supra note 28.
42. 397 U.S. 664 (1970).
43. The federal government and every state grant churches a property tax exemption modelled after a Virginia statutory scheme adopted in 1800. Id. at 676-77.
44. The provision exempted all property owned by nonprofit educational facilities and
charitable organizations including hospitals, libraries, playgrounds, scientific, professional, historical, and patriotic groups. Id at 672-73.
45. Id
46. Id. at 676.
47. Id. at 674.
48. 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
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parochial school teachers salaries. The Court invalidated the program not
only because it promised certainly to entangle church and state in complicated administrative procedures, but because legislative debates over such
annual appropriations would immerse the state in heated church-related debates as well. 49 The Court treated this second concern with excessive political entanglement as separate from the problem of potential administrative
entanglement the Court discussed in Walz v. Tax Commission.
B.

Recent Estabhshment Clause Analysi's of State Aid Programs

Using the three-pronged purpose-effect-entanglement inquiry, the
Supreme Court has invalidated several different attempts to aid parochial
elementary and secondary schools. 50 The Court has struck down reimbursements for the administration of teacher-prepared tests, graded by sectarian
personnel but mandated by the state; 5 1 appropriation of funds for auxiliary
services for pupils; 52 salary supplements for teachers of secular subjects in
religious schools;5 3 loans of secular instructional materials; 54 and funds for
55
field trip transportation.
The Court's rationale in these cases has often been a circular one. 56 A
49. Id at 620. This concern with political entanglement is the problem of political divisiveness. The Court warned that religious concerns fostered by aid programs will find their way
into the political process, thereby intensifying "political fragmentation and divisiveness on religious lines." Id. at 623.
50. Aid to parochial elementary and secondary schools is generally subject to a higher level
of scrutiny than assistance to church-affiliated colleges and universities. Case Comment, supra
note 14, at 276 n.58. Compare Committee for Pub. Educ. v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756 (1973) (disallowing a state grant to church-affiliated elementary and secondary schools for the repair and
maintenance of secular buildings) with Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672 (1971) (approving
state grants to sectarian colleges for the erection of secular classrooms).
In Lemon the Court acknowledged the District Court's conclusion that parochial schools
constitute an "integral part of the religious mission of the Catholic Church." Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 616 (1971). This process of inculcating religious doctrine, the Court noted,
is "enhanced by the impressionable age of the pupils, in primary schools particularly." Id
51. Levitt v. Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty, 413 U.S. 472 (1973).
52. Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349 (1975). Meek examined the constitutionality of a
Pennsylvania plan which provided aid directly to nonpublic schools in the form of textbook
loans, loans of instructional materials and auxiliary services. The auxiliary services, which were
to be provided by state employees within the parochial schools, included: guidance, counseling
and testing services; remedial and therapeutic services; speech and hearing services; and services
for the educationally disadvantaged. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 9-972(b) (1974). The Meek
Court upheld the portion of the Pennsylvania plan that provided for the loan of textbooks to
parochial school children, but struck down the provisions for the loan of instructional materials
and auxiliary services. Writing for the Court, Justice Stewart reasoned that the textbook provision was constitutionally indistinguishable from the aid approved in Board ofEducation v. Allen
392 U.S. 236 (1968). justice Stewart distinguished the provision for instructional materials
which, although secular in nature, would have the "unconstitutional primary effect of advancing religion because of the predominantly religious character of the schools..." Meek, 421 U.S.
at 363. With respect to the auxiliary services authorized under the statute, Justice Stewart
concluded that excessive entanglement would result from efforts by the state to regulate the
activities of the state employees who rendered the services within a predominantly religious
environment. Id at 371-72.
53. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
54. Meek, 421 U.S. at 349. See supra note 52.
55. McKeesport Area School Dist. v. Pennsylvania Dept. of Educ., 446 U.S. 970 (1980);
Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229 (1977).
56. See generally Case Comment, supra note 14, at 276-77 (discussing the perplexing circularity in the Court's reasoning in state aid cases).
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program may be deemed unconstitutional if no surveillance or auditing procedure is included to ensure the continued nonreligious use of the granted
aid. On the other hand, under the Walz rationale, the assistance program
may demand too much government surveillance and consequently violate
the excessive administrative entanglement test.
The Supreme Court has recently approved several aid programs barely
distinguishable on the facts from those rejected earlier.5 7 The provisions upheld included: reimbursements to private schools for the cost of therapeutic
and diagnostic services; 58 administration of state-prepared and graded
6°
tests; 59 and maintenance of state-mandated records.
The obvious inconsistencies of the Burger Court in delineating the
boundaries of nonestablishment in aid to private education have drawn
sharp criticism. 6 1 Prior to Mueller v. Allen, however, the Court was consistent
in its treatment of tax benefit programs for parents of children attending
62
nonpublic schools.
The Supreme Court grappled with the issue of the constitutionality of
tuition tax benefit programs for the first time in 1973 when it decided Commite for Pub/ic Education and Religious Liberty v. Nyqulst 6 3 and Sloan o. Lemon .6
Sloan examined the constitutionality of a Pennsylvania statute which
57. See generally Note, supra note 2 (discussing the Burger Court's tendency to decide establishment clause cases on "very narrow" factual grounds).
58. Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229 (1977). Wolman questioned the constitutionality of an
Ohio statute which provided many of the types of auxiliary services struck down in Meek v.
Pillenger. See supra note 52. The Ohio aid plan differed from the program invalidated in Meek in
that the services and materials were directed to the school children, rather than to the parochial
schools themselves. Further, the Ohio statute distinguished diagnostic services, which involve
the detection of health problems, and therapeutic services, which concern the treatment of
health problems. The therapeutic services would be offered only in designated public centers,
off the private schools' premises. See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3317.06 (Page Supp. 1976). The
distinctions the Court drew between Meek and Wolman have been criticized as "distinctions
without substance." Hunter,supra note 29, at 544. See generally Comment, supra note 2, at 123643 (comparing Wolman and Meek).

59. Wolman, 433 U.S. at 229.
60. Committee for Pub. Educ. v. Regan, 444 U.S. 646 (1980).
61. Justice White claims the Court "sacrifices clarity and predictability for flexibility." Id
at 662. Justice Stevens, however, implored the Court to try to patch together the "blurred,
indistinct and variable barrier" between church and state. Id at 671 (Stevens, J., dissenting)
(quoting Lemon, 403 U.S. at 614).
62. See, e.g., Sloan v. Lemon, 413 U.S. 825 (1973) (struck down tuition reimbursements to
parents of children attending private elementary and secondary schools which were to be paid
out of revenues from a state tax); Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413
U.S. 756 (1973) (held unconstitutional tuition reimbursements, grants and income tax credits to
parents of children attending private schools); Public Funds for Pub. Schools v. Byrne, 590 F.2d
514 (3rd Cir.) (denied tax deduction of up to $1,000 for each dependent child of the taxpayer
attending a private school), afdmem., 442 U.S. 907 (1979). Kosydar v. Wolman, 353 F. Supp.
744 (S.D. Ohio 1972) (invalidated tax credits to parents with excessive educational expenses),
aJ'dmem sub. nom. Grit v. Wolman, 413 U.S. 901 (1973); Wolman v. Essex, 342 F. Supp. 399
(S.D. Ohio) invalidated gifts to parents of $90 for each child enrolled in a private school, afd
mem., 409 U.S. 808 (1972), Minnesota Civil Liberties Union v. Minnesota, 302 Minn. 216, 224
N.W.2d 344 (1974) (struck down tax credits for educational costs to parents of children attending private schools), cerl. denied 421 U.S. 988 (1975). See generally Case Comment, supra note 14,
at 277-83 (general discussion of the Court's treatment of Nyquist and other tax benefit cases
following that decision).
63. 413 U.S. 756 (1973).

64. 413 U.S. 825 (1973).
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provided direct tuition reimbursements to parents of children attending nonpublic schools. The statute authorized a $75 reimbursement for each private
elementary school student and $150 for each secondary school student attending a private school, providing such reimbursements did not exceed actual tuition paid. 65 This financial assistance was funded by revenues
generated from a state sales tax on cigarettes. 66 The Court determined that
this plan violated the establishment clause because of its "intended conse'6 7
quence . . .to preserve and support religion-oriented institutions.
In Nyquisl, 68 decided the same day as Sloan, the Court considered a tax
benefit statute similar to the one challenged in Mueller v. Allen. Nquist invalidated a New York statute which provided a tuition relief program for parents of children attending nonpublic elementary or secondary schools. The
statute provided parents with a tuition reimbursement if their income was
less than $5,000, or with a tuition deduction if they didn't qualify for the
reimbursement and their income was less than $25,000.69
Determining that both provisions violated the primary effect test, the
Court dispensed with the argument that the payments were not aiding sectarian institutions per se since they were directed to the parents, not the
schools. 70 The Court found that the ultimate effect of the tuition reimbursement was "unmistakably to provide financial support for nonpublic sectarian institutions," because it provided financial incentive for parents to send
their children to sectarian schools 7 ' and ensured their financial ability to do
SO.

72

In striking down the tax deduction, the Court reasoned that like the
reimbursement, the deduction rewarded parents for sending their children to
nonpublic schools. 73 The Court noted that the deduction operated, in effect,
as a tax credit since it yielded a fixed amount of "tax forgiveness" in exchange for performing an act which the state desired to encourage. 74 The
65. Id. at 828.
66. Id. at 829.
67. The Court reasoned:
The State has singled out a class of its citizens for a special economic benefit. Whether
that benefit be viewed as a simple tuition subsidy, as an incentive to parents to send
their children to sectarian schools, or as a reward for having done so, at bottom its
intended consequence is to preserve and support religion-oriented institutions.
Id. at 832.
68. 413 U.S. 756 (1973).
69. Id at 764-66.
70. The Court in effect rejected the child benefit theory, supra note 29, when it recognized
that a law need not provide direct aid to the schools to be constitutionally invalid. See 413 U.S.
at 786.
71. Nyquist, 413 U.S. at 786.
72. Id at 783.
73. Id at 791.
74. Id. at 789. For a general discussion of tuition tax credits and an explanation of the
credit-deduction distinction, see Comment, Social Implications and Constituttnahy of Recent Proposals for Tuition Tax Credits for Parents of Private School Children, 51 UMKC L. REV. 286 (1983).
Tuition tax credits permit taxpayers to offset their income tax liability with a designated
amount of the tuition they paid during the taxable year. Unlike the tuition tax credit, a tuition
tax deduction is an amount subtracted from the taxpayer's taxable income, not from the actual
amount of tax due. The tax credit has an equalizing effect in that both high and low income
taxpayers get the same size benefit, providing that they have pre-credit liability equal to or
greater than the designated credit. See id.at 287.
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Court then specifically reserved decision on the constitutionality of a "genu75
ine tax deduction."
With
Circuit, 76
variety of
nonpublic

the exception of one federal district court decision in the Eighth
in the decade following Nyquist courts uniformly struck down a
tax benefit plans granting relief to parents of children attending
77
schools.

Rhode Island Federation of Teachers v. Norberg78 is a reflection of the solid
consensus 79 that has developed outside the Eighth Circuit in opposition to
the tax benefit packages that provide indirect aid to nonpublic, sectarian
schools. In Norberg the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit relied on Nyquist to invalidate a Rhode Island statute 8° granting parents of all elemenincome tax deduction for
tary and secondary school students a personal
8
tuition, textbook and transportation expenses. '
The district court determined that the fact the statute was applicable to
parents of students attending public as well as nonpublic schools was "mere
3
window dressing." 8 2 Relying heavily on statistical evidence demonstrating
that the
the unequal impact of the deduction, the court of appeals concluded
84
primary effect of the Rhode Island statute was to aid religion.
75. Nyquist, 413 U.S. at 790 n.49.
76. Minnesota Civil Liberties Union v. Roemer, 452 F. Supp. 1316 (D. Minn. 1978). The
statute upheld in Roemer was the same one challenged in Mueller v. Allen. The statute withstood
constitutional scrutiny in Roemer in part because it purported to benefit the parents of children
in sectarian and nonsectarian schools, as well as children enrolled in public schools. 452 F.
Supp. at 1320-22. The Court also emphasized that the statute provided a true tax deduction.
Id at 1321.
77. Case Comment, supra note 14, at 279-80. For examples of the federal courts' treatment
of tax benefit plans, see supra note 62. State courts have also had the opportunity to scrutinize
tuition aid statutes. See, e.g., People ex rel. Klinger v. Howlett, 56 Ill. 2d 1, 305 N.E.2d 129
(1973) (relied on Nyquist to invalidate a similar grant program); Minnesota Civil Liberties
Union v. State, 302 Minn. 216, 224 N.W.2d 344 (1974) (invalidated tax credits for educational
costs incurred by parents of children attending nonpublic schools), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 988
(1975).
Several state courts have struck down tuition aid programs as violative of their state constitutions. See, e.g., Sheldon Jackson College v. State, 599 P.2d 127 (Alaska 1979) (college tuition
grant program held a violation of Alaska Constitution); California Teachers Ass'n v. Riles, 29
Cal. 3d 794, 632 P.2d 953, 176 Cal. Rptr. 300 (1981) (textbook loan program to nonpublic
school students found violative of state constitution). Weiss v. Bruno, 82 Wash. 2d 199, 509
P.2d 973 (1973) (grants of $100 for elementary school students and $300 for secondary school
students, at least 85% of which were used to fund nonpublic school students, were invalidated).
78. 630 F.2d 855 (1st Cir. 1980).
79. See generally Case Comment, supra note 14, at 279-83 (discussing Norberg and other examples of the judiciary's general opposition to tax plans conferring relief on parents of private
school children).
80. R.I. GEN. LAws § 44-30-12(c)(2) (1980). Provisions of this statute are identical to the
Minnesota statute upheld in Mueller. See supra note 8.
81. Norberg, 630 F.2d at 863.
82. Norberg, 479 F. Supp. 1364, 1371 (D.R.I. 1979).
83. Id. at 1366. The Court of Appeals used a de facto, rather than de jure analysis in
determining the breadth of the benefitted class. A de jure analysis involves examining the face
of a statute to determine whether the benefitted class is legislatively drawn along religious lines.
In contrast, a de facto approach demands a statistical or factual inquiry into the breadth of the
benefitted class. See generally Comment, supra note 13, at 549 (discussing distinction between de
jure and de facto analysis).
84. Norberg, 630 F.2d at 860.
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MUELLER V. ALLEN

Facts

From 1955 until their state legislature repealed section 290.09(22) in
1983,85 Minnesota taxpayers were permitted tax deductions for elementary
and secondary school expenses. Under the statute, all parents were allowed
to deduct from their gross personal income all expenses incurred for tuition,
transportation and textbooks (including secular instructional materials and
equipment), not to exceed $500 for elementary school dependents and $700
86
for secondary school children.
In Mueller v. Allen 8 7 Minnesota taxpayers challenged the state's tax benefit scheme, claiming the statute amounts to an establishment of religion and
restrains free exercise of religion in violation of the first and fourteenth
amendments of the Constitution. 88 The district court summarily dismissed
the free exercise claim, stating that the plaintiffs had failed to specify how
their religious beliefs were infringed. 8 9
In support of their establishment clause claim the plaintiffs alleged that
an overwhelming majority of taxpayers who utilized the deduction had dependents attending parochial schools. 90 The plaintiffs submitted statistical
evidence indicating that over 95 percent of nonpublic school students in
Minnesota attended parochial schools during the 1979-80 school year. 9 '
The plaintiffs further asserted that although the number of parochial students constituted only slightly more than 10 percent of the total elementary
and secondary school population in Minnesota, 92 71 percent of the approximately $2,400,000 in revenue lost by the state through the tuition portion of
the deduction was attributable to use of that deduction by parents of paro93
chial school students.
These facts, the plaintiffs argued, in conjunction with the fact that Minnesota public schools are tuition free to most residents,94 show that the overwhelming percentage of tax relief granted under the statute was for tuition
expenditures for religiously affiliated education. Consequently, the primary
effect of the statute was the advancement of religion. The plaintiffs further
85. Act of April 23, 1955, c. 741, sec. 1, § 290.09(19), 1955 Minn. Laws 1148, 1154 (codified
at MINN. STAT. § 290.09(22) (1982)), repealed by 1983 Minn. Laws c. 342, art. 1, § 44. Text of
statute appears at note 3.
86. MINN. STAT. § 290.09(22) (1982). Amendments in 1976 added the provision for textbooks, defined to include instructional materials and equipment, and raised the deduction from
$200. See Act of March 8, 1976, c. 37, § 1, 1976 Minn. Laws 93.
87. 514 F. Supp. 998 (D. Minn. 1981),,.fd, 676 F.2d 1195 (8th Cir. 1982), afd, 103 S. Ct.

3062 (1983).
88. 514 F. Supp. at 999.
89. Id at 1003.
90. 676 F.2d at 1197.
91. Id at 1198.
92. The evidence indicated that a total of 820,000 students were enrolled in the Minnesota's elementary and secondary schools during the 1979-80 school year. Of these children,
90,954 attended private schools, and of these, 86,906 were enrolled in religiously affiliated
schools. These 86,906 students comprised 10.6% of the total elementary and secondary school
population. Id
93. Id. at 1199.
94. Id at 1199.
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contended that the statute did not have a valid secular purpose and that it
95
fostered an impermissible entanglement between church and state.
The district court granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment, holding that the statute is neutral on its face and as applied, and that
its primary effect is neither to advance nor inhibit religion. 96 On appeal, the
Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's finding that the
statute does not violate the establishment clause. 97
Because of the conflict between the First and Eighth Circuits 98 regarding the constitutionality of the type of tax benefit package challenged in
Mueller, the Supreme Court granted certiorari. 99
B.

Rationale
1.

Majority Opinion

In a five to four split,'0° the Supreme Court affirmed the court of appeals decision, upholding the Minnesota statute. 1 1 Writing for the majority, Justice Rehnquist focused on Nyquzst1 0 2 to determine whether
Minnesota's tax deduction better resembled the forms of state aid to parochial schools that have been approved by the Court, than those aid packages
that have been struck down.' 0 3 After applying the three-part establishment
clause test, the Court concluded that the Minnesota arrangement bore a
greater resemblance to the assistance programs upheld in prior decisions
04
than to the program struck down in Nyquzst. 1
a.

Secular Purpose

The Court found three valid purposes behind the Minnesota statute,
each of which would be sufficient to satisfy the secular purpose requirement
under the three-part establishment clause inquiry.' 0 5 First, the state's decision to offset the cost of educational expenses incurred by all parents of elementary and secondary school children helps to ensure an educated
populace, thereby protecting the political and economic health of the
06
community. 1
Second, assuring the continued financial health of private schools helps
to relieve the public schools of their corresponding financial burdens. Thus,
the Court maintained, this program functioned for the benefit of all
95. Id. at 1197.
96. 514 F. Supp. at 1003.

97. 676 F.2d at 1205.
98. See supra notes 78-83 discussing and accompanying text Rhode Island Federationof Teachers
v.Norberg.
99. 103 S. Ct. 48 (1982).
100. Justice Rehnquist delivered the opinion of the Court in which Chief Justice Burger
and Justices White, Powell and O'Connor joined. Justice Marshal filed the dissenting opinion,
joined by Justices Brennan, Blackmun and Stevens.
101. 103 S. Ct. at 3064.
102. 413 U.S. 756 (1973).
103. 103 S. Ct. at 3066.
104. Id
105. Id
106. Id
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taxpayers. 1

Finally, the Court found that private schools afforded "wholesome competition" for the public schools, promoting the state's interest in providing
the highest quality education for all children within its boundaries. 108
b.

Przna, Efct

Justice Rehnquist devoted most of his attention to the primary effect
inquiry, determining whether the statute has the "primary effect of advancing the sectarian aims of the nonpublic schools."' 1 9 In concluding that the
statute does not have such a primary effect,' 1° the Court looked to several
''particularly significant" features of the Minnesota arrangement."'
First, the Court recognized that Section 290.09(22) is merely one of
many deductions available under the Minnesota tax laws and acknowledged
that legislatures have "broad latitude" 1 2 in creating classifications and distinctions in such tax statutes. The Court concluded that the Minnesota legislature's judgment that a deduction for educational expenses equally
distributes the tax burden between its citizens "is entitled to substantial
deference."' 13
Next, the Court focused on the breadth of the benefited class under the
statute, emphasizing that the deduction is available to all parents regardless
of whether their children attend public, non-sectarian private or sectarian
private schools. The Court determined that the fact the Minnesota statute
"neutrally provides state assistance to a broad spectrum of citizens" 114 significantly distinguishes Mueller from Nyquzil. The statute in Nyquist authorized
benefits only for parents of nonpublic school students.
The Court then considered the nature of the beneficiaries of the Minnesota tax deductions. The Court found that in channelling its assistance to
individual parents rather than directly to the schools, Minnesota "reduced
the Establishment Clause objections."' 15 Conceding that such assistance to
parents has an economic effect comparable to that of aid given directly to
the schools, the Court nevertheless determined that the fact the aid is disbursed to the parents is a material consideration in establishment clause
107. Id
108. Id (quoting Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229, 262 (1977) (Powell, J., concurring in
part, dissenting in part)).
109. 103 S. Ct. at 3067 (quoting Committee for Pub. Educ. v. Regan, 444 U.S. 646, 662
(1980) and Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971)).
110. 103 S. Ct. at 3067.
111. The Court considered the statute in its entirety and did not invoke a separate primary
effect analysis for each of the textbook, tuition and transportation deductions. The Court
noted, however, that its conclusion was unaffected by the fact that the statute permitted textbook and transportation deductions. These, it reasoned, should be approved under Everson and
Allen. Id. at 3070 n. 10.
112. Id at 3067 (quoting Regan v. Taxation with Representation, 103 S. Ct. 1997, 2002

(1983)).
113. Id
that ase did
Id. 3067-68
114. Id.
115. Id.

at 3067. The Court asserted that this finding does not conflict with Nyquist since
not involve a tax benefit plan having the elements of a "genuine tax deduction."
at n.6.
at 3068-69.
at 3069.
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analysis. 116
Because the public funds under the Minnesota arrangement became
available only as the result of "numerous, private choices of individual parents,"11 7 the Court explained, such assistance cannot be viewed as conferring
state approval "on any particular religion, or on religion generally." 1 8 The
Court further maintained that this type of "attenuated financial benefits
. . . that eventually flows to parochial schools from the neutrally available
tax benefit" 119 is not an evil against which the establishment clause was
designed to protect.
The Court rejected the argument that, notwithstanding the facial neutrality of Section 290.09(22), in application the statute primarily benefited
religious institutions. 120 The Court dismissed the petitioner's statistical analysis of the type of persons claiming the tax deduction, declining to "engage
in an empirical inquiry."' 12 ' Evaluating the constitutionality of a statute on
the basis of such evidence, reasoned the Court, "would scarcely provide the
122
certainty that this field stands in need of.'
The Court concluded its primary effect inquiry with recognition of the
contributions private schools make to the communities in which they operate. The Court suggested that any "unequal effects" the Minnesota statute
might confer on sectarian schools be regarded as a "rough return" for the
23
benefits these schools provide to the state and its taxpayers.1
c.

Excessive Church-State Entanglement

Focusing on the potential administrative entanglement the statute
might create, the Court determined that the only possible source of excessive
government entanglement under Section 290.09(22) was the statutory requisite that state officials determine whether particular textbooks qualify for a
deduction.' 24 However, such involvement, asserted the Court, does not differ substantially from the government involvement in programs the Court
has approved in Board of Education v. Allen, Wolman v. Walter, 125 and Meek v.
Piltenger.126 Thus, concluded the Court, the Minnesota statute does not excessively entangle the state in religion.
116. Id
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 3069-7 1. Petitioners argued that most parents of public school children incur no
tuition expenses and that other expenses deductible under § 290.09(22) are negligible in value.
Further, they claimed that 96% of the children in private schools attend sectarian institutions.
Id at 3070.
121. Id at 3070.
122. d.
123. Id.
124. Under the Minnesota statute, no deductions are allowed for instructional books and
materials used in teaching religious tenets, doctrines or worship. See Minn. Stat. § 290.09(22)
(1982).
125. Like Allen, Wolman upheld a statutory provision authorizing the state to loan textbooks
to pupils in private and public schools. Woman, 433 U.S. at 236-38.
126. Meek upheld the loan of textbooks "acceptable for use in public schools." Meek, 421
U.S. at 362.
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2.

Dissenting Opinion

In dissent, Justice Marshall criticized the majority's conclusion that the
Minnesota statute is "vitally different" 127 from the New York statute at issue
in Nyquist. On the contrary, asserted Marshall, the Minnesota tax provision
violates the establishment clause for the same reason the statute was struck
down in Nyquist. Like the New York statute, he explained, the Minnesota
statute had "a direct and immediate effect of advancing religion."' 28 In his
dissent, Marshall focused on the tuition and textbook deductions allowable
under the statute.
a.

The Tuition Deduction

Marshall conceded that the Minnesota statute served a valid secular
purpose, but this, he cautioned, is not enough to "immunize from further
scrutiny a law which. . . has a primary effect that advances religion."' 129 In
concluding that Minnesota's statutory tuition deduction has the primary effect of promoting religion, Marshall discounted the fact that the deduction
was in the form of indirect assistance to parochial schools. He asserted that
indirect aid in the form of assistance to parents for tuition payments is as
impermissible as direct assistance to the schools when there is not an effective
means to ensure that the aid supports only the secular functions of the

institution. 130
Marshall noted that because there is no such means of restricting the
aid provided under the Minnesota statute to the secular functions or services
of the schools, Mueller is distinguishable from Board of Education v. Allen and
Everson v. Board of Education which upheld aid "carefully restricted to the
3
purely secular side of church-affiliated institutions."' '
Comparing the Minnesota deduction to the aid struck down in Nquist,
Marshall maintained that, like the New York statute, the Minnesota provision operates as "a financial incentive to parents to send their children to
sectarian schools."' 32 Whether or not this incentive is in the form of a tax
credit or tax deduction is irrelevant in determining the primary effect of the
assistance. 133 Marshall suggested that the majority's formalistic distinction
34
between these types of assistance is "a distinction without a difference.'
Likewise, Marshall rejected the majority's contention that Mueller is significantly distinguishable from Nquzst by the fact that the Minnesota statute
was facially neutral, providing assistance to eligible parents regardless of
whether their children attend nonpublic or public schools. Marshall emphasized that the Court has in the past "unequivocally rejected"' 35 the notion
that it should look exclusively to what the statute on its face purports to do
127. 103 S. Ct. at 3072.
128. Id.
129. Id

130.
131.
132.
133.
134.

(quoting Nyquist, 413 U.S. at 774).

103 S. Ct. at 3073.
Id.at 3076 (quoting Sloan v. Lemon, 413 U.S. 825, 832 (1973)).
103 S.Ct. at 3073 (quoting Nyquist, 413 U.S. at 786).
Id. at 3075-76.
Id at 3075.

135. Id at 3074 (citing yqu~it, 413 U.S. 756).
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and ignore the effect of its actual operation. He noted that in Sloan v.
Lemon 136 the Court, in concluding that a Pennsylvania statute violated the
establishment clause, took into consideration the fact that more than 90 percent of the children enrolled in private schools were attending religious institutions. 1 37 Further, Marshall noted, the Nyquist Court recognized that the
bulk of New York's nonpublic schools were sectarian in orientation1 38 and
that the tax reductions authorized under the New York statute primarily
39
benefited parents of children attending those sectarian schools.1
Marshall points out that the fact that the Minnesota statute has the
primary effect of promoting religion can be determined "without any resort
to the type of 'statistical evidence' that majority fears."' 140 He reasons that
"[h]istory and experience . . .[indicate] that any generally available financial assistance for elementary and secondary school tuition expenses mainly
will further religious education because the majority of schools charging tui41
tion are sectarian."'
b.

The Textbook Deduction

Marshall charged that the textbooks and instructional materials subsidized under the textbook deduction "plainly may be used to inculcate religious values and belief.' 1 42 Marshall reiterated the finding in Meek that the
secular education parochial schools provide goes "hand in hand with the
religious mission" of those schools. 143 Thus, he concluded, secular texts and
instructional materials contribute to the religious mission of those schools.
Marshall distinguished Allen, noting that the textbooks at issue in that
case "had been chosen by the state for use in the public schools.' 1 4 4 By
comparison, "the Minnesota statute does not limit the tax deduction to
books the state has approved . . .[but] permits a deduction for books that
145
are chosen by the parochial schools themselves."'
In concluding his dissent, Marshall praised the limits articulated in Nyquist. Such limits he writes, were drawn "with appropriate regard for the
1 46
Comprinciples of neutrality embodied by the Establishment Clause."'
paring Mueller, he attacked the majority's decision as "flatly at odds with the
fundamental principle that a state may provide no financial support whatso47
ever to promote religion.'
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.

413 U.S. 825 (1973).
See id.at 830.
Nyqutkt, 413 U.S. at 780.
Id at 794.
103 S. Ct. at 3074.
Id. at 3075.
Id at 3077.
Id (quoting Meek, 421 U.S. at 366).
Id (citing Allen, 392 U.S. at 244-45).
Id
Id at 3078.
Id.
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C.

Analysts of the Mueller Decision

Although Everson v. Board of Education precludes an attack on the transportation deduction granted under Minnesota's tax laws, 148 the deductions
granted for tuition and textbook expenses do not satisfy the three-part inquiry -ofmodern establishment clause analysis.
The majority's decision to uphold the statute conflicts with the solid
49
judicial consensus that has developed in opposition to such tax benefits. 1
Modern establishment clause analysis demands a stricter application of the
three-part inquiry than that relied on by the Mueller Court.
1.

Secular Purpose

The Mueller majority correctly recognized several valid secular purposes
attributable to the Minnesota statute. As the dissenters cautioned, however,
a valid purpose "should not immunize from further scrutiny a law which
150
. . .has a primary effect that advances religion."'
2.

Primary Effect

In determining the primary effect of the statute, the Court totally disregarded an essential criterion of the primary effect test: whether the statute's
secular aspects are identifiable and separable from its religious aspects. 5 '
This criterion requires that the form of aid and the nature of the beneficiary
are such that a legislature can be certain that only secular educational activities are aided.
As Marshall noted in his dissent, the Minnesota statute provides no effective means of restricting the aid it provides to the secular functions of the
private schools.' 52 Although the statute requires state officials to disallow
deductions taken for books and materials used for the purpose of teaching of
religious tenets or doctrines or for religious worship, it does not prescribe any
method for monitoring the types of materials parents base their deductions
on. Moreover, the tuition deduction fails the separable and identifiable criterion since tuition charges at the elementary and secondary school level are
generally not apportioned on a course-by-course basis. Parents, then, cannot
accurately separate the secular course costs from the costs of the religious
instruction their children receive.
Treating the Minnesota statute as merely one of many deductions available under the state's tax laws, comparable to deductions for charitable contributions, is inappropriate.' 53 Tuition payments are distinguishable from
charitable contributions because the parents receive a service for their pay148. See id. at 3070 n. 10. See alsoCase Comment, supra note 14, at 284.
149. See generally supra note 77.
150. 103 S. Ct. at 3072. (Marshall, J., dissenting) (quoting Nyquisi, 413 U.S. at 774).
151. See generally supra note 38.
152. 103 S. Ct. at 3073.
153. See generally Case Comment, supra note 14, at 285 (discussing distinctions between charitable contribution deductions and tuition deductions). See alsoNote, supra note 16, at 231-33
(asserting that charitable deductions require a different analysis than that required for tuition
deductions).
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ments. A contribution, on the other hand, is simply a direct gift to an instiMoreover, unlike tuition deductions, charitable contributions
tution.
generally benefit a broad class of institutions, with religious organizations
merely one category among the larger class of nonprofit groups receiving
donations.
Contrary to the Court's footnote suggestion, 154 it is likewise irrelevant
that the Minnesota tax benefit scheme resembles more a "genuine tax deduction" than the tax credit form of assistance at issue in Nquist. The Nyquist Court emphasized the arbitrariness of the challenged tax benefit,
which, unlike a genuine tax deduction, enabled parents to decrease their
adjusted gross income in an amount unrelated to the amount actually spent
on tuition. 155 But the apparent emphasis on this distinction is minimized by
the yquist Court's focus on the substantive impact of the New York tax
156
benefit plan.
The Nyquist majority had noted that whether the assistance is labelled a
reimbursement, a reward or a subsidy, its substantive impact is still the
same. 157 The form of the aid, the Court held, should be examined only "for
the light that it casts on the substance."' 158 This suggests that, under a primary effect analysis, the constitutionality of the Minnesota statute should
not have turned on the fact that the tax benefits were true tax deductions.
Rather, the statute should have been evaluated in terms of its substantive
impact on religious institutions.
In determining the substantive or primary effect of the statute, the
59
breadth of the benefited class has been recognized as a "pivotal factor"'
and, thus, deserves the attention the Mueller Court accorded it. But in declining to engage in an empirical inquiry' 6° regarding the actual impact of
the Minnesota deductions, the Court employed a de jure analysis of the statute, focusing on its facial neutrality.
Emphasizing the fact that the statute provides deductions to eligible
parents of students attending either public or nonpublic schools, the Court
virtually ignored the glaring evidence that the overwhelming majority of
parents eligible for the deductions are parents of children attending private,
sectarian schools. 16 1 As Justice Marshall points out in his dissent, this is
154. 103 S. Ct. at 3067-68 n.6.
155. Nyquzst, 413 U.S. at 789. The New York statute invalidated under Nyquust authorized
for parents of children enrolled in nonpublic schools tuition reimbursements of $50 per grade
school child and $100 per high school student, so long as such amounts did not exceed 50% of
actual tuition paid. To qualify, parents' annual income had to be less than $5,000. Id at 764.
For parents with adjusted gross incomes of $25,000 or less who did not qualify for the tuition
reimbursement, the statute authorized a deduction unrelated to the amount actually expended
on tuition, but calculated on the basis of a formula contained in the statute. Id. at 765-66 &
n. 18.
156. See generally Note, supra note 9, at 815 (discussing Nyquist and the "true tax deduction
test").
157. Nyquist, 413 U.S. at 786.
158. Id at 790.
159. Norberg, 630 F.2d at 861; see also Comment, supra note 13, at 547 (discussing the significance of the breadth of the benefitted class).
160. 103 S. Ct. at 3070.
161. Mueller, 676 F.2d at 1195.
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obvious even without statistical data, in light of the fact that most schools
charging tuition are nonpublic and most of those nonpublic schools are

sectarian. 162
Although prior to Mueller the Court had not determined whether a de
jure or de facto analysis would be more appropriate in determining the
breadth of the benefited class, ' 6 3 by adopting a de jure approach the Court
renders the primary effect test meaningless. The primary effect test requires,
1 64
by definition, an inquiry into the actual, primary impact of the statute.
By looking only to what the statute, on its face, purports to do, the Court is
granting the state legislature deference with respect to the primary effect test
165
in the same way it grants such deference under the secular purpose test.
The primary effect requirement, then, ceases to be an effective limit on state
aid to religion. In essence, this means that legislatures would be permitted to
subsidize religious institutions as long as they provided similar aid to public
facilities, regardless of the incidental nature of the assistance to the latter.
It is not possible to adhere to the establishment clause principle and
ignore the substantive impact of a statute. Evaluating this impact requires a
factual determination of the breadth of the benefited class.'66 The Nyquist
Court made such a determination when it recognized that 85 percent of New
York's nonpublic schools are church-affiliated. 16 7 Similarly, the First Circuit Court of Appeals in Norberg relied on evidence that 94 percent of the
students who attend nonpublic and tuition-funded public schools in Rhode
Island are enrolled in sectarian schools. 16
In discussing the primary effect of the Minnesota statute, the Mueller
Court emphasized that whatever benefit flowed to the parochial schools was
an "attenuated" one, since the actual benefits of the deduction flowed to the
parents, rather than directly to the schools. 169 The Court seems to be applying the child benefit rationale 170 the Court relied on in Board of Educati'on v.
A//en to uphold the loan of secular textbooks. Under the child benefit theory, state aid that would be struck down if given directly to the parochial
schools is upheld if given, instead, to the parents and children. This theory,
however, was effectively rejected when the Nyquisl Court recognized that a
162. See Mueller, 103 S. Ct. 3074-75.
163. See Comment, supra note 38, at 695-96.
164. In Roemer v. Board of Public Works, 426 U.S. 736 (1976), the Court stated that a
"[sitate may not, for example, pay for what is actually a religious education ...
even though it
makes its aid available to secular and religious institutions alike." Id. at 747. See also Minnesota
Civil Liberties Union v. Roemer, 452 F. Supp. 1316, 1320 (D. Minn. 1978) (facial neutrality of a
statute and the fact that its operative reach may extend beyond sectarian class is constitutionally insufficient if the statute, in fact, supports religious activity). See generally Comment, supra
note 13, at 549-50 (discussing distinctions between the dejure and de facto analysis with respect
to the primary effect test).

165. See generally Roemer, 452 F. Supp. at 1318 n.l (the Court generally accepts legislative
statements of secular purpose at face value).
166. See generally Note, supra note 9, at 817-23 (discussing the significance of the breadth of
the benefitted class and the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit's treatment of this in
Mueller).

167. Nyqujis, 413 U.S. at 768.
168. NAorberg, 630 F.2d at 859.
169. Mueller, 103 S. Ct. at 3069.
170. See generally supra note 41.
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statute does not have to provide direct assistance to parochial schools to have
an unconstitutional effect. 17 1 The Nyquist majority, in fact, cautioned that
the fact aid is disbursed to parents rather than directly to the schools is "only
1 72
one among many factors to be considered."
3.

Excessive Entanglement

The Mueller Court's analysis under the excessive entanglement prong of
the three-part establishment clause inquiry is defective for two primary reasons. First, the Court focuses on administrative entanglement, disregarding
the potential political government entanglements the statute could create.
Such a political entanglement could arise when a private school selects textbooks not clearly secular in content and parents claim a deduction for the
cost of those texts. State officials may challenge this deduction and the controversy between the parent and government could conceivably evolve into a
dispute between the state and the sectarian school regarding the secular classification of the textbooks. This is precisely the kind of entanglement the
first amendment prohibits.
Secondly, the Court's application of the excessive entanglement test is
defective because its administrative entanglement analysis is deficient. The
Court fails to recognize that the primary effect inquiry and excessive entanglement tests are interdependent. 73 Some government entanglement is required to ensure that the primary effect requirement is satisfied, but the
excessive entanglement test may be violated in the process.
As Justice Marshall observed, the Minnesota statute did not guarantee
the separation of the religious and secular education functions of the religious institutions it benefited and thus failed to ensure that the state aid
supported only secular functions. Ensuring that deductions such as those
prescribed by the Minnesota legislature are not used for sectarian materials
would require the continuous government surveillance or auditing declared
174
constitutionally impermissible by the Wale Court.
In comparing the entanglement involved under the Minnesota statute
to the types of entanglement permitted under Allen, Woman and Meek, the
Court fails to recognize an important factual distinction between these cases
and Mueller. Unlike the Minnesota program, these programs allowed the
state to pre-select and pre-screen the materials loaned to the private schools
171. Nyquutt, 413 U.S. at 756.
172. Id. at 781.
173. See Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664 (1970). The Wakz Court recognized that no
perfect or absolute separation between church and state is really possible. The Court stated
that "the very existence of the Religion Clauses is an involvement of sorts-one that seeks to
mark boundaries to avoid excessive entanglement." Id at 670. In Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S.
602 (1971), the Court grappled with the problem of determining the nature and degree of state
entanglement permissible to ensure a state aid program did not violate the establishment clause.
The Lemon Court invalidated a Rhode Island statute subsidizing salaries paid to teachers employed by nonpublic schools. The Court acknowledged that to avoid the effect of fostering
religion, comprehensive and continuous state surveillance would be necessary to ensure that the
subsidized teachers did not inculcate religious beliefs or engage in any religious instruction. The
Court found, however, that such surveillance would involve excessive entanglement between
state and church. Id. at 619.
174. See Wakz, 397 U.S. at 675.
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to ensure their secular nature, thus obviating the need for continued surveillance.175 Such surveillance would be necessary under the Minnesota statute
since it allows the private schools to select the texts eligible for deductions.
IV.

CONCLUSION

Although the Court did not overrule Nyquist, it has significantly curtailed Nyquist's utility as a guidepost in the area of state aid to church-affiliated schools. In distinguishing the Minnesota tax benefit scheme from the
New York statute struck down in Nyquist, the Mueller Court has limited
Nyquz'st applicability in tax benefit cases.
The Mueller Court implies that the Nyquist precedent will only be triggered when the tax benefit at issue is in the nature of a tax credit and when
the statute is not neutral on its face, providing benefits only to nonpublic
schools. The Court appears to be making "distinction[s] without a difference,"' 176 rejecting a de facto analysis of the statute's actual impact in favor
of a less scrutinizing de jure review of what the statute on its face purports to
do. By adopting a dejure approach to the establishment clause analysis, the
Court has succeeded in granting legislative deference to both the stated purpose and effect of statutes providing tax benefits for parents of parochial
school students. This approach signifies a departure from the rigid threepart inquiry the Court has previously relied upon in analyzing establishment
clause cases and perhaps foretells a less structured constitutional analysis of
state aid programs in the future.
The Mueller case exemplifies the unpredictable pattern characterizing
establishment clause cases. Instead of bolstering the structured analysis that
has developed over the past three decades, the Court appears to be once
77
again "sacrificing clarity and predictability for flexibility."'
Justice Rehnquist's opinion provides state legislatures with a less defined constitutional framework to work within as they draft tuition tax relief
plans. Although the Minnesota statute upheld in Mueller may become the
model for state assistance programs conferring tax benefits on parents of parochial school children, these state programs will still face constitutional
challenges and will still be subject to the judiciary's unpredictable line
drawing.
The Mueller decision has, perhaps, provided the lower courts with more
freedom in evaluating the constitutionality of state aid programs by relieving
them of the burdensome rigidity of the three-part test. Such judicial flexibil175. The statute upheld in Allen authorized the loan of secular textbooks to nonpublic
schools, but required prior approval of such loans by public school authorities. A//en, 392 U.S.
at 244-45. Similarly, the statute upheld in Wo/man authorized public funding for the purchase
and loan of textbooks to pupils attending nonpublic schools, but required that requests for the
books be filtered through the superintendent of the public schools and local school district officials. See Wo/man, 433 U.S. at 236-37. In Meek, the Court upheld a program providing for the
laon of texts and instructional materials "acceptable for use in any public elementary, or secondary school of the Commonwealth." Meek, 421 U.S. at 353-54. The statute mandated that
requests for such materials be approved by the State Secretary of Education. Id
176. Mue//er, 103 S.Ct. 3075 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
177. Regan, 444 U.S. at 662.
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ity, however, is the source of the conflict between the circuits that brought
Mueller v. Allen before the Supreme Court.
Anne C Stark

